Where have all the Monads Gone? Substance and Transcedental Freedom in Schleiermacher by Mariña, Jacqueline
Where Have All the Monads Gone?
Substance and Transcendental
Freedom in Schleiermacher*
Jacqueline Marin˜a / Purdue University
While there is no doubt that the early Schleiermacher was both a Spino-
zist and a determinist, it has remained an open question whether the ma-
ture Schleiermacher continued to espouse Spinozism and the manner of
determinism entailed by it.1 Included in this question is whether the later
Schleiermacher thought of the self as a genuine metaphysical substance hav-
ing real powers of its own, or whether he thought God was the only genu-
ine substance, so that at bottom consciousness of the spontaneity of the self
was only an unavoidable illusion. Certainly the later Schleiermacher pro-
tested that his theology was decidedly not pantheistic.2 I have argued else-
where that the decisive turn in Schleiermacher’s thought was his abandonment
of Spinozism and his espousal of a modified version of Leibniz’s philosophy:
the self is a genuine center of power.3 Contra Leibniz, however, the self not
only expresses itself out into the world of others, it is also capable of receiv-
ing their influence: it is a self-subsistent monad with open windows.
* An earlier version of this essay was presented at the American Academy of Religion 2012 an-
nual meeting. I am grateful to a reviewer at the Journal of Religion for excellent comments that
pushed me to sharpen the argument.
© 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
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1 For instance, Julia A. Lamm, in The Living God: Schleiermacher’s Theological Appropriation of
Spinoza ðUniversity Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1996Þ, treats Schleiermacher’s work,
both early and later, as a post-Kantian Spinozism. She claims that “Schleiermacher’s system re-
mains a form of Spinozism, not only nominally in its direct appeal to Spinoza ð“the holy rejected
Spinoza!”Þ but also fundamentally” ð86Þ. For a view acknowledging Schleiermacher’s Leibnizian
inheritance, see Manfred Frank, “Metaphysical Foundations,” inThe Cambridge Companion to Frie-
drich Schleiermacher, ed. Jacqueline Marin˜a ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005Þ, 15–34.
2 Protests can be found in Friedrich Schleiermacher, On the “Glaubenslehre”: Two Letters to
Dr. Lu¨cke, in Schleiermacher Kritische Gesamtausgabe, ed. Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of Sciences
ðBerlin: de Gruyter, 1972–Þ ðhereafter KGA, cited parenthetically in the text by division, volume
½and sometimes also part$, and page numberÞ, I.10:307–94, and, as I note below, throughout the
second edition of Christian Faith.
3 See Jacqueline Marin˜a, Transformation of the Self in the Thought of Friedrich Schleiermacher
ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2008Þ, chaps. 2–4.
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This article explores the later Schleiermacher’s metaphysics of substance
and what it entails concerning the question of transcendental freedom.
I show that in espousing a metaphysics of substance, Schleiermacher also
abandoned an understanding of nature as a mere mechanism, a view im-
plying what I call a “state-state view of causation” ð“SSV” for shortÞ. Adoption
of the view of the self as substance was motivated by the primacy of practical
and religious concerns in Schleiermacher’s later work: inChristian Faith, an
analysis of self-consciousness from a first person point of view grounds this
understanding of the self. In fact, inChristian Faith, ontology, and thereby the-
ology, is only possible through such a first person analysis. The development
of Schleiermacher’s views over time, and the reasons accompanying this de-
velopment, can be fully understood only the in the context of his engage-
ment with the work of Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. In what follows I trace this
development through an analysis of the philosophical problems and influ-
ences shaping Schleiermacher’s mature view, and shed light on his un-
derstanding of self-consciousness and its relation to God. My own account
should also serve to correct some recent misunderstandings that have made
their way into the secondary literature.4
In the first three sections of this article I lay out the principle contours of
the “antinomy of agency” troubling the early Schleiermacher, providing an
analysis of SSV therein presupposed and its relation to Spinozism. In the
third and fourth sections of the article I show why Schleiermacher’s even-
tual solution to the antinomy, namely, the espousal of the idea of self-active
substances, also committed him to transcendental freedom in Kant’s sense.
In the fifth section I flesh out Kant’s concept of transcendental freedom and
demonstrate that it can coexist with the self’s complete determination by God.
Finally, the last section addresses the importance of this metaphysic of sub-
stances to Schleiermacher’s religious and ethical outlook, and provides an
analysis of Schleiermacher’s method of theology from a first person point of
view inChristian Faith.
4 In particular, I have in mind Andrew Dole’s book Schleiermacher on Religion and the Natural
Order ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 2010Þ, in which Dole argues that “in his mature work
½Schleiermacher$ once again gave articulation to a conviction that he had first expressed in his
mid-twenties: that the best way to understand oneself qua human being . . . is to understand
oneself as a being whose every thought, feeling, and action are the necessary product of the
operation of chains of natural causes stretching back to the beginning of time” ð36–37Þ. As such,
“all events within the natural order, including the ‘innermost’ events within the human soul, are
appropriate objects of scientific research” ð151Þ. Therefore, he argues, Schleiermacher accounts
for Christianity ðand indeed all religionsÞ as a fully “natural phenomenon” ð146Þ and then adds
a thin “theological overlay” that he then “superimposed” on it ð147Þ; Schleiermacher’s under-
standing of Christianity is a “supplemented naturalism” ð138Þ. My discussion of Schleiermacher’s
metaphysics of substance demonstrates that the later Schleiermacher’s espousal of a Leibnizian
metaphysics of substance and its implications contradict Dole’s account in very significant ways,
especially in regard to Dole’s claim that Schleiermacher believed the best way to understand oneself
is in terms of mechanistic causality.
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I. THE ANTINOMY OF AGENCY
One of Schleiermacher’s central preoccupations in his early essay On Free-
dom ð1790–92Þ was with the concept of agency and the conditions of act at-
tribution.5 There we find Schleiermacher puzzling over an “antinomy of
agency,” namely, the fact that the conditions of act attribution seem sub-
ject to two conflicting demands.6 The first demand is one that we find de-
veloped by Hume, Leibniz, and other compatibilists regarding the concept
of freedom, namely, that in order to cogently attribute an action to an agent,
the agent’s action must be connected with the agent’s character, that is,
it must be seen to follow from the agent’s motives, desires, and beliefs.7 Put
more technically, any change of state, and therefore any beginning of an
action, presupposes a prior state of the not yet acting cause. It would seem
that if we are to posit an action as flowing from an agent, we need to con-
nect the beginning of this action with the agent’s state before it began to
act. This state would encompass the agent’s motives, desires, and beliefs,
which we could then connect causally with the agent’s subsequent action.
Failing such a link, the action would have no connection with prior states
and would thereby be an absolute beginning. However, the problem with
such absolute beginnings is that they are groundless; they cannot be shown
to flow from the prior states or character of the agent, but are arbitrarily pro-
duced, having no rhyme or reason insofar as they are not connected with
character and motive. In such a scenario, while there is no causal necessity
to an agent’s action, there seems to be no intelligibility to it, either. The
action cannot be intelligibly connected with the agent or the agent’s mo-
tives ðassuming these are contained in the prior states of the agentÞ, and as
such a crucial requirement of act attribution—that the action be attribut-
able to the agent—is defeated.
It is for these reasons that Hume found what he called “the liberty of
indifference,” namely, “a negation of necessity and causes,” so objection-
5 With the exception of a passage fromOn Religion and two passages fromOn Freedom ðcited
in the notesÞ, all translations of Schleiermacher’s work are my own.
6 I develop this problem at length in Jacqueline Marin˜a, “Schleiermacher on the Philoso-
pher’s Stone: The Shaping of Schleiermacher’s Early Ethics by the Kantian Legacy,” Journal of
Religion 79, no. 2 ð1999Þ: 193–215; a revised version appeared as the first chapter in Transfor-
mation of the Self. What I present in this section is a short summary of the results uncovered
there, which I discuss in order to motivate the fundamental problem I am developing here,
namely, the motives behind Schleiermacher’s adoption of transcendental freedom.
7 Compatibilism is the view that human actions can be thought of as both fully determined
by natural causes and as free; the two concepts are not thought to contradict one another
because compatibilists typically understand freedom as the capacity to act in accordance with
one’s wants, wishes, and desires, and these states of the self must be understood to have a
causal genesis if an action is to stem from an agent’s character. Incompatibilists hold that the
two concepts, freedom and determinism, contradict one another and cannot be made to
agree. As this essay will show, the incompatibility of freedom and determinism can have two
different grounds, depending upon how both freedom and determinism are understood.
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able.8 In his Theodicy Leibniz had also recognized a similar problem, noting
the difficulties with what he called “an indifference of equipose,” where “all
is completely even on both sides, without any inclination towards either.”9
Action resulting from such indifference leads to the absurdity of a “deter-
mination for which there is no source.”10 Indifferent actions do not have a
sufficient reason. They cannot be connected with a motive grounded in the
character of the agent, who would thereby be predisposed to act in one way
rather than another. Indifferent agents have no grounds in accordance with
which to chose one way or another. Schleiermacher, too, recognized this
problem in On Freedom. He asks, “How can I be responsible for an action
when we cannot determine the extent to which it belongs tomy soul?” ðKGA
I.1:316Þ Following Hume’s discussion, he questions how we can understand
the motive for an action if it cannot be explained in terms of the agent’s
character, and hence his/her prior states. Failing such a condition, actions
“are based on chance” for they “have no ground at all” ðKGA I.1:316Þ, which
means they have nothing to do with the condition of the agent, that is, his or
her psychological states and disposition. Schleiermacher concludes that this
idea of “complete chance . . . certainly cancels morality more than anything
else” ðKGA I.1:317Þ.
Considerations such as these motivated Hume’s compatibilist proposal
reconciling freedom and necessity. On such a compatibilist understanding,
an agent can be said to act freely just in case s/he acts in accordance with her
wants, wishes and desires, even though these are causally necessitated, and
cannot be other than what they are. Let us call this proposal “simple com-
patibilism.” Such a compatibilist solution to the problem of freedom and
determinism was quite appealing to the early Schleiermacher, even though
he recognized significant problems with it that would later lead him to give
it up.
The problem with this proposal, Schleiermacher recognized, is that it
seems to run afoul of a second competing demand of act attribution, namely,
that we ultimately ground the action in the agent. The causal chain leading
to an agent having the motives that she in fact has extends back in time in-
finitely, and precedes the very existence of the agent. Viewed in this way, the
ground of action is external to the agent, and the agent, as such, could not be
said to be its initiator, but would be, rather, a kind of turnspit. In On Freedom
he notes: “This resonance of the soul is in turn a product of preceding and
occasioning impressions, and so, resist as we may, all is at last dissolved in
8 David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby Bigge ðOxford: Oxford University
Press, 1978Þ, 407. Just a few sentences earlier Hume makes the important point, “According
to my definitions, necessity makes an essential part of causation; and consequently liberty, by
removing necessity, removes also the causes, and is the very same thing with chance. As chance
is commonly thought to imply a contradiction, and is at least directly contrary to experience,
there are always the same arguments against liberty or free will.”
9 G. W. Leibniz,Theodicy, trans. E. M. Huggard ðLaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1985Þ, § 46, 148.
10 Ibid., § 48, 149.
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external impressions. So, of all that belongs to the action, what can we then
assign to the agent? Do we see the agent in some way? We can think of the
agent only as suffering! Or where is the power that is active? It dissolves into
infinitely many infinitesimally small external forces that leave us with noth-
ing to think of as firmly active in the subject.” ðKGA I.1:257Þ.11 On such a
scenario, the individual is a mere placeholder in a given causal chain where
all is mechanically determined; as Schleiermacher puts it, she flashes “all the
colors, but merely according to the laws of refraction. Of all that you see in
the person’s actions, nothing belongs to the person” ðKGA I.1:257Þ.12 Here
the agency of the agent disappears, since the causal grounds for each action
ultimately can be traced back to events preexisting the agent.
II. CAUSAL DETERMINISM, MECHANISTIC CAUSATION, AND SPINOZISM
Schleiermacher certainly realized the deep connections between the adop-
tion of SSV in natural causation and Spinozism.13 This SSV was closely tied
to empiricist views on natural causation, since we only have empirical access
to the states in which objects appear, and not to their inner powers. In his
early years he had adopted both this view of empirical causation and Spi-
nozism, using his reflections on the implications of this empiricist view of
causation to support his Spinozism. As I note below, the later Schleierma-
cher dubbed this SSV of causation “mechanistic causation.” It will help our
inquiry if, before I engage in close textual analysis, I do a bit of concep-
tual work. What I call the SSV of determinism in natural causation is the
following:
The state of any given object at t2 is a function of the state of the object at t1,
the relation of its state at t1 to the states of all other objects influencing it at that time,
and the causal laws governing that influence and the changes that will ensue.
Two things stand out as extremely important: first, here there is no talk of
the inner powers of substances ðwhich as such can never appearÞ, but only
of the states of objects, and the relation of these states to past states. Sec-
ond, each state of an object is understood as having been fully determined
by both the states that preceded it in time and the causal laws governing
changes of state. Once we focus on the determination of the states of an ob-
ject and the laws governing those determinations, an important problem
arises, namely, difficulty in understanding how such states might themselves
be expressions of the inner powers of substances. The reason for this dif-
ficulty lies in that on such an understanding states are always understood in
11 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Freedom, trans. Albert L. Blackwell ðLewiston, NY: Mellen,
1992Þ, 42–43.
12 Ibid., 43.
13 I am grateful to Dana Tulodziecki, who helped me to come up with this name.
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relation to prior states, not in relation to the inner powers of substances,
which in any case never appear. On this model, insofar as any empirical
object A has a genesis, namely, a beginning in time, the first state of that
object’s existence is not thought of as an expression of the inner powers of
the substance, but rather as a state that follows upon a previous state. That
previous state will not be a state of the object A that has just come into being,
but of something else. Three things follow: first, given that all states are de-
termined by prior states, all temporal states of A’s existence will, in the last
analysis, have been determined by states of affairs that preexisted A. As such,
these temporal states are not thought of as the expression of the inner pow-
ers of A, but have their sufficient reason in something prior to A’s coming into
being. Second, given the impossibility of identifying the effects of the pow-
ers of a substance, pinpointing the identity, and therefore the existence, of
genuine substances becomes a problem. And third, given that what we are
dealing with here is law-governed changes of states throughout the natural
order, these states are best understood as states of one underlying substance.
This is because in thinking the change of the final state of B to the first state
of A, we must posit an ultimate underlying substance which is neither A nor
B, but to which such states and changes of state belong. Only such an un-
derlying substance provides us with the necessary unity allowing us to think
the transition from the final state of B to the first state of A. Spinozism is
therefore the result.
Considerations such as these were certainly at the foreground of the
Spinozism controversy, with which Schleiermacher was quite familiar. As
such, the Spinozism put forward by Schleiermacher in his early essays,
“Spinozism” and “Short Presentation of the Spinozistic System” ðboth from
around 1793–94Þ, went hand in hand with the determinism and simple
compatibilism espoused by the young Schleiermacher, which, as I have
shown in the first section, concerns itself first and foremost with the de-
termination of temporal states. According to this version of Spinozism ðwhich
he, at that time, did not think contradicted the Kantian view of thingsÞ, there
is but one fundamental ground of the whole series of appearances, and
each appearance is deterministically related to the whole. Now, for our
purposes we can correlate the way an object appears at a given time with its
state at that time; thus we may speak of a series of the appearances of an
object or of a series of its states. In “Spinozism,” Schleiermacher connects
the appearance of a seed to the whole series of appearances, that is, to the
whole series of states that led to its genesis. Once we speak of a series of
states, each of which has its sufficient reason in the states that preceded it,
Spinozism is the result. Schleiermacher notes that “if a noumenon should
be the ground of the whole series of appearances from seed to tree, then this
series may not end here, it must extend itself to all previous trees and seeds
and those that follow, and because the mechanical and chemical changes
The Journal of Religion
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in the thing, and the ground of their relation to others, must be just so well
preformed as the organic, which are so precisely interconnected with it, then
this series must extend throughout the whole world of sense, and we thereby
come once more to the Spinozistic relation” ðKGA I.1:526–27Þ.
What is it that grounds the series of transitions from seed to tree? If
we were to posit something that underlies these transitions ðthe powers of
a substance that ground the changes from state to stateÞ we could not find
a sufficient reason to limit the expression of the powers of this substance
to the changes that appear to us in the transition from seed to tree. This is
because the first state of the seed and the transitions it will undergo ðnamely,
“the mechanical and chemical changes in the thing”Þ are preformed, namely,
predetermined by what appeared before the genesis of the seed. As such,
Schleiermacher reasons, what appeared before must itself also be an ex-
pression of the same substance grounding both seed and tree, for the seed
had its sufficient reason in those previous series of appearances. Spinozism
is the result: all appearances are interconnected and deterministically re-
lated to one another; they are but expressions of the one noumenon that
grounds or underlies them. Important here is that there is but one series
of appearances: the unity and interconnection of such appearances in one
temporal manifold quite naturally lends itself to the supposition that the
appearances are those of a single ground which contains them all eminently
within itself, and as such each appearance has its sufficient reason in the
single noumenon grounding the whole world of sense.
The early Schleiermacher also mentions another important issue closely
interrelated to the argument above. This is the mapping problem: how do
we identify and demarcate metaphysical substances from one another if all
that is given to us empirically is a series of changes of state? Strictly speak-
ing, substances never appear; only their states or accidents do. How then do
we map this series of changes, which extends infinitely into the past and the
future, onto the powers of distinct individual substances? How do we know
where one substance begins and another ends? “But tell us something about
how and why you distinguish the phenomena as separate objects. Does this
distinction have to do with the one combination, so that you would know
you have grasped precisely that which results from a monad connection
through your representation? How might you know this? Or does it have to
do with this: that just what you see as your object belongs to a common cen-
tral monad? How do you know this then, and how have you achieved this
knowledge of monads through which to separate the individuals from one
another?” ðKGA I.1:548Þ These were powerful considerations that led the
early Schleiermacher to reject the idea of a plurality of monads and to posit
a single, underlying substance. Nevertheless, Schleiermacher would realize,
as Kant before him had seen, that there were equally powerful, yet signif-
icantly more important, considerations that spoke in favor of the idea of a
Where Have All the Monads Gone?
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plurality of substances or monads. For Kant, these were practical consider-
ations; for Schleiermacher, these considerations would be both practical and
spiritual.14
III. KANT, LEIBNIZ, AND THE THREAT OF SPINOZISM
Kant well understood the connections between the model of causation out-
lined above and the threat that Spinozism posed to morality. If there is but
one substance, one real center of power, decision and action, there are no
real moral agents, either. It was on practical grounds that Kant reintroduced
the Leibnizian idea of the community of substances, each with its own in-
telligible character grounded in its monadic properties. Nevertheless, Kant
believed that it was only through the transcendental philosophy affirming
the unknowability, on theoretical grounds, of the true character of things
in themselves that the idea of such a community of intelligible substances
could be upheld on grounds having to do with the primacy of practical rea-
son. Hence in his late work of 1790, “On a Discovery Whereby any New Cri-
tique of Reason is to Be Made Superfluous by an Older One,” Kant notes
that “the Critique of Pure Reason might well be the true apology for Leibniz,
even against those of his disciples that heap praises upon him that do him
no honor” ðAA 8:251Þ.15 Now what the transcendental philosophy was sup-
posed to hold at bay was the specter of Spinozism, which made the idea of
a true community of substances, each with its own inner powers not deter-
mined by external forces, impossible. Were the empiricist view of causation
outlined above true of things as they are in themselves, morality could not
14 I speak here of the primacy of the practical in Kant’s philosophy. For Kant, this amounts to
the idea that we may posit the reality of something such as freedom so long as if, from a theo-
retical point of view, its impossibility has not been proven, and the idea of its reality is morally
required. Certainly Kant would agree that the existence of genuine moral subjects, centers of
power and decision, ranks among one of the realities that must be assumed from a moral point
of view.
15 Citations to Kant’s works are provided parenthetically. Two modes of citation will be used.
Citations from theCritique of Pure Reason ðKrVÞ refer to the pagination of Kant’s first ð“A”Þ and/or
second ð“B”Þ editions. All other excerpts from Kant’s work are cited by volume and page number
and refer to the standard edition of Kant’s works, Kants gesammelte Schriften ðthe Akademie Ausgabe,
hereafter AAÞ, edited by the Royal Prussian, later German, then Berlin-Brandenburg Academy of
Sciences, in 29 volumes ðBerlin: Reimer; de Gruyter, 1900–Þ. All translations are from the Cam-
bridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992–Þ. Since
these translations always provide the Academy edition pagination, page numbers for translations
are omitted. The Cambridge edition translations containing works cited are Correspondence,
trans. and ed. Arnulf Zweig ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999Þ; Critique of Pure Rea-
son, trans. and ed. Paul Guyer and Allen Wood ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998Þ;
Lectures on Metaphysics, trans. and ed. Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon ðCambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997Þ;Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer ðCambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press,
2005Þ; Practical Philosophy, trans. and ed. Mary Gregor ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996Þ; Critique of Practical Reason; Religion and Rational Theology, trans. and ed. Allen W. Wood and
George di Giovanni ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996Þ; and Theoretical Philosophy after
1781, ed. Henry Allison and Peter Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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be saved. In a draft of his essay “What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in
Germany?” Kant notes that “the origin of the critical philosophy is morality,
with respect to the imputability of action” ðAA 20:335Þ.16 So long as action
originates from the inner powers of a substance, the action is imputable to the
agent. Not so in the Spinozistic business, wherein there is no such plurality,
but rather a single underlying ground in which all events take place. Hence in
the Critique of Practical Reason Kant noted that such a monism makes of finite
agents and actions mere “accidents” inhering in the one substance, and that
on such a view “freedom could not be saved” ðAA 5:101–2Þ.17
At this point it will be useful to review the conceptual entailments dis-
cussed so far: determinism in accordance with a model of mechanistic cau-
sation implies Spinozism, that is, the idea that there is only one underlying
substance in which all changes of state take place. If we deny Spinozism,
we also deny mechanistic causation ðthe view of causal influence discussed
aboveÞ. Denial of this empiricist view of causation ðimplying only one center
of powerÞ implies that there are either multiple centers of power, or there
are none.18 Since the expression of power and its transfer is evident through-
out all of existence, there must be multiple centers of power.
The key, then, to avoiding Spinozism and saving morality lies in provid-
ing an account allowing us to posit a multiplicity of substances, namely, real
persons that are centers of decision and action. However, as we have seen,
the idea of a multiplicity of substances contradicts the SSV of empirical cau-
sation. The problem the early Schleiermacher saw with Leibniz’s positing of
such a multiplicity of monads was that it remained a mere hypothesis, since
it contradicted the empirical view of causation, and since Leibniz could not
solve themapping problem.While Leibniz had shown that suchmonads were
logically possible, he did not show how we could find them in the empiri-
cal world: “We could in fact say to him ½Leibniz$: you in fact believe to have
shown through your hypothesis how and why many substances are possi-
ble. But tell us how and why you should distinguish the phenomena as sep-
arate objects” ðKGA I.1:548Þ.
16 See Kant’s 1798 letter to Garve, where he notes that what aroused him from his “dogmatic
slumber” was the question of freedom vs. the necessity of nature ðAA 12:257–58Þ.
17 Schleiermacher makes a similar point, although here he does not connect it to the ques-
tion of freedom: “Were there no monads, then Spinoza would be correct, and all outside God
would be ignored, and would disappear as an accidental attribute because the things would be
lacking their own ground of endurance” ðKGA I.1:547Þ.
18 The early Schleiermacher noted that if we deny Spinozism, “it must be replaced either
by Leibniz’s monads or the Eleatic acatalepsy ½skepticism$” ðibid.Þ. The second choice Schleier-
macher lists, namely, skepticism ðthe first is a monadology of substanceÞ, is different from the
one I consider above ðthat there are no centers of powerÞ. Nevertheless, since skepticism is not
an account of what is, but concerns only our capacity to know it, it should not be considered
an option regarding the fundamental nature of reality. Given this consideration, what is im-
portant here is that Schleiermacher lists Leibniz’s monads as the only other option should Spi-
nozism be denied.
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Given the conceptual entailments discussed above, Kant realized he
needed to come up with an account that both saves the phenomena of em-
pirical causation and preserves that which morality requires, namely, genuine
persons. Since the view that substances are genuine centers of power con-
tradicts the SSV of empirical causation and is as such incompatible with
it, Kant needed to demonstrate the compatibility of compatibilism with in-
compatibilism.19 In other words, he needed to show that the simple compat-
ibilism of Hume, which redefined freedom as action in accordance with
one’s wants, wishes, and desires, and as therefore compatible with the em-
piricist view of mechanistic causation, was itself compatible with the incom-
patibilist understanding of substances as genuine centers of power, which
contradicted the empiricist view of causation. It is well known that the way
Kant achieved this complex compatibilism was through his distinction be-
tween appearances and things in themselves in the Critique of Pure Reason:
things as they appear to us stand in relation to us; however, these same things
can be thought of in abstraction from their relation to us, or how they appear
to us, and as such would be considered as things in themselves.20 Insofar as
things are given to me in space and time I understand them both in relation
to me and to each other, but not in terms of their monadic properties, that
is, those properties that do not depend on their relation to anything outside
of them. Space and time are but a system of relations contributed by the cog-
nizing subject. They are not features of things in themselves; as such, what is
given to me in space and time are appearances that are fundamentally re-
lational. Insofar as the SSV of causation, through which we relate states of
affairs to one another, depends on the spatiotemporal manifold, it too will
only yield a system of relations in this single spatiotemporal manifold. Since,
however, this spatiotemporal manifold is the necessary contribution of the
subject to cognition, it is not a feature of things in themselves, and neither
are any of the features of the phenomena that appear in it, including the
causal relations among them. From a theoretical point of view things in
themselves are unknown and unknowable. The upshot of Kant’s statement
that he found it necessary to “deny knowledge to make room for faith”
ðKrV, B xxxÞ was that denial of theoretical, metaphysical knowledge of the
nature of things in themselves allowed room for rationally ascribing to such
things in themselves what morality required, given the primacy of practical
reason. This was the strategy recommended by Kant in the second Critique :
“Consequently, if one still wants to save it ½freedom$, no other path remains
than to ascribe the existence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and
so too its causality in accordance with the law of natural necessity, only to
19 The issue is treated at length by Allen W. Wood in “Kant’s Compatibilism,” in Self and Nature
in Kant’s Philosophy, ed. Allen W. Wood ðIthaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984Þ, 74.
20 On this point, see Henry Allison,Kant’s Transcendental Idealism ðNew Haven, CT: Yale Uni-
versity Press, 2004Þ.
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appearance, and to ascribe freedom to the same being as a thing in itself”
ðAA 5:95Þ.
Kant saw that if space and time were features of things in themselves,
Spinozism would result. He notes that “If I take space and time as predi-
cates, qualities of things in themselves, Spinozism arises immediately” ðMeta-
physik K2, AA 28:803Þ; “If we regard space as real, we assume Spinoza’s sys-
tem” ðMetaphysik Dohna, AA 28:666Þ; “If I take space as an entity in itself,
then Spinozism is irrefutable . . . space is the Godhead, it is single, omnipres-
ent, nothing can be thought outside of it, everything is in it” ðMetaphysik L2,
AA 28:567Þ. The argument is presented at length in the section entitled
“Critical Elucidation of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason” of the second
Critique. There Kant relates the idea that space and time are features of
things in themselves ðtranscendental realismÞ to causal realism, the idea that
relations between events described in the model of empirical causation de-
scribed above belong to things in themselves. This model depends upon the
presupposition that there is a single spatiotemporal manifold through which
distinct events are relatable to one another. If this spatiotemporal manifold
is thought to be transcendentally real, then so are the relations, including
those of causation, found in it. Hence Kant argues, if we are transcendental
realists about space and time, attributing them to things in themselves, the
standard model of causation also applies, and freedom cannot be saved.
Kant notes that, “Now, if one takes the determinations of the existence of
things in time for determinations of things in themselves ðwhich is the most
usual way of representing themÞ, then the necessity in the causal relation can
in no way be united with freedom; instead they are opposed to each other as
contradictory” ðAA 5:94Þ. Further, Kant continues, if we are transcendental
realists about space, time, and causation, Spinozism results: “Hence, if this
ideality of time and space is not adopted, nothing remains but Spinozism, in
which space and time are essential determinations of the original being itself,
while the things dependent upon it ðourselves, therefore, includedÞ are not
substances but merely accidents inhering in it; for, if these things exist merely
as its effects in time, which would be the condition of their existence itself,
then the actions of these beings would have to be merely its actions that it
performs in any place and at any time” ðAA 5:101–2Þ. The arguments pre-
sented here are buttressed by those found in the first analogy of the first
Critique : the requirement of the unity of experience to posit a single spatio-
temporal field through which distinct events are relatable to one another
ðcausationÞ presupposes the idea of a single underlying substance, in which
all alterations take place. Only through the notion of such an underlying sub-
stance can discrete phenomenal events be relatable to one another. If we think
of space as transcendentally real, instead of as a form of intuition grounded
in the representational capacities of finite subjects such as ourselves, Spi-
nozism unavoidably results.
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For these reasons Kant believed that only through the critical philosophy,
which argued that space and time are not features of things in themselves,
could Spinozism be avoided and morality saved. The business of morality
only makes ultimate sense if we posit genuine individuals in communion
with one another, and not “mere inhering accidents.” As I argue below, the
positing of transcendental freedom, as the “power of beginning an action
von selbst,” has first and foremost to do with the positing of substances whose
inner powers are not determined by intra-worldly forces external to them. It
is what must be posited in order to steer clear of Spinozism. Only if there
are such substances is true personhood possible; in Reflexion 4225 Kant
notes, “The question, whether freedom is possible, is perhaps the same as
the question whether the human being is a true person and whether the I is
possible in a being with relational/outer determinations” ðob das Ich in einem
wesen von aeusseren Bestimmungen moeglich seyÞ ðAA 17:464–65Þ.
IV. TRUE PERSONS, TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM, AND A SOLUTION
TO THE ANTINOMY OF AGENCY
It was certainly considerations such as these, along with important others,
that led Kant to defend the possibility of transcendental freedom and its
compatibility with phenomenal necessity in the Critique of Pure Reason. There,
it will be recalled, we find Kant’s famous definition of transcendental free-
dom as “a faculty of absolutely beginning a state, and hence also a series of
its consequences” ðKrVA445/B473Þ Kant later continues: “By freedom in the
cosmological sense, on the contrary, I understand the faculty of beginning
a state from itself, the causality of which does not in turn stand under another
cause determining it in time in accordance with the law of nature. Freedom
in this signification is a pure transcendental idea, which first, contains noth-
ing borrowed from experience, and second, the object of which also can-
not be given determinately in any experience” ðKrVA533/B561Þ. The early
Schleiermacher was quite familiar with Kant’s notion of transcendental free-
dom; his early essays were a youthful attempt to appropriate elements of
Kant’s philosophy while rejecting others. His early rejection of Kant’s tran-
scendental freedom is connected with two important considerations. First,
the nature of the early Schleiermacher’s objections to transcendental free-
dom reveal that he did not fully grasp what Kant was up to in his development
of the idea. Second, the early Schleiermacher’s acceptance of the complete
causal determination of nature, that is, his “simple compatibilism,” went hand
in hand with his early Spinozism.
Schleiermacher’s early rejection of Kant’s transcendental freedom resulted
from his misunderstanding of how Kant conceived of it. Kant did not think
of transcendental freedom as an uncaused event, one unconnected with
prior events, thereby not only rendering the unity of experience impossible,
but making it impossible to understand how to attribute action to an agent.
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ðThis would have been the way that Hume understood “the liberty of indif-
ference”Þ. In fact, in the Critique of Practical Reason Kant notes:
If, then, one wants to attribute freedom to a being whose existence is determined
in time, one cannot, so far at least, except this being from the law of natural necessity
as to all events in its existence and consequently as to its actions as well; for, that would
be tantamount to handing it over to blind chance. But since this law unavoidably con-
cerns all causality of things so far as their existence in time is determinable, if this were
the way in which one had to represent also the existence of these things in themselves
then freedom would have to be rejected as a null and impossible concept. Conse-
quently, if one still wants to save it, no other path remains than to ascribe the exis-
tence of a thing so far as it is determinable in time, and so too its causality in accor-
dance with the law of natural necessity, only to appearance, and to ascribe freedom to
the same being as a thing in itself. ðAA 5:95Þ
Transcendental freedom does not apply to phenomena existing in time;
as Kant himself notes, were phenomenal events excepted from causal laws,
they would have to be understood as springing up in accordance with blind
chance and could not be connected with prior experience. Instead, Kant at-
tributes transcendental freedom to substances considered in themselves, that
is, in abstraction from their relation to us. However, every phenomenal event
has a cause. As such, a person’s empirical character, namely, that whichmakes
its appearance in the phenomenal world, must be understood as fully deter-
mined in the world of sense. Hence Kant famously notes that “for a subject of
the world of sense we would first have an empirical character, through which
its actions, as appearances, would stand through and through in connection
with other appearances in accordance with constant natural laws, from which,
as their conditions, they could be derived; and thus in combination with these
other appearances, they would constitute members of a single series of the
natural order” ðKrV A539/B567Þ. Transcendental freedom, however, is not
something that appears at all; indeed it cannot appear, for it is a characteristic
of the subject considered noumenally, and not a characteristic of a subject as
it is given to the representational faculty of another finite subject. Now ac-
cording to Kant, the empirical character is a manifestation, an appearing,
of the intelligible character. Transcendental freedom applies only to the sub-
ject’s intelligible character. The intelligible character is not temporal, and thus
not subject to the law of succession. Now, we can think of the intelligible char-
acter of a substance in terms of its monadic properties, namely, the proper-
ties that it has in itself; they are the inner grounds of the powers of substance
which finite subjects such as ourselves could never cognize ðthey could only
beknown by God through an intellectual intuitionÞ. Hence Kant notes that,
For since these appearances, because they are not things in themselves, must be
grounded in a transcendental object determining them as mere representations,
nothing hinders us from ascribing to this transcendental object, apart from the prop-
erty through which it appears, also another causality that is not appearance, even
though its effect is encountered in appearance. . . . One would also have to allow this
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subject an intelligible character, through which it is indeed the cause of those actions
as appearances, but which does not stand under any conditions of sensibility and
is not itself appearance. The first one could call the character of such a thing in ap-
pearance, the second its character as a thing in itself. ðKrVA539/B567Þ
Free actions are not groundless; they are the expressions of the intelligible
character. Even when not considered from the point of view of appearance
and hence not as causally determined, free actions are still the expressions of
an agent’s intelligible character, and are, as such, attributable to the agent.
Considered as free they are not unmoored from the intelligible character of
the subject, and hence the problem that Schleiermacher details inOn Free-
dom regarding the problem of connecting free actions with agents is not
applicable to Kant’s view.21
From 1800 onward, that is, from the time of the writing of the Monologen,
we can see Schleiermacher adopting a position similar in important ways to
that of both Leibniz and Kant with respect to persons as initiators of action.
There are, of course, important differences between all three figures. For in-
stance, Schleiermacher seems to have ignored the transcendental ideality
of space and time, which Kant believed grounded his distinction between
appearances and things in themselves. However, the later Schleiermacher
shares with both Leibniz and Kant a commitment to the idea that at the most
fundamental metaphysical level ðin relation to the worldÞ, the self ultimately
must be considered as the originator of its own actions. Leibniz, for exam-
ple, notes that “the soul has within it the principle of all its actions.”22 When
Kant considers the subject’s intelligible character, he notes that it is transcen-
dentally free, that is, it is the originator of its actions. Kant tells us that “tran-
scendental freedom . . . must be thought as independence from everything
empirical and so from nature generally, whether it is regarded as an object
of inner sense in time only or also of outer sense in both space and time;
without this freedom ðin the latter and proper senseÞ, which alone is practi-
cal a priori, no moral law is possible and no imputation in accordance with
it” ðAA 5:97Þ. Transcendental freedom is independence from determining
causes antecedent in time, and hence independence from everything em-
pirical. This independence entails, at the very least, that the agent must be
the source of her own actions. As it will become yet clearer in my discussion
below, Kantian subjects have at least this much in common with Leibnizian
monads. And the mature Schleiermacher realized that this Kantian Leibniz-
ianism is the only solution that avoids both the Scylla and Charybdis of the
antinomy of agency. On this view we posit substances with inner powers that
are not determined by agents external to themselves; in this sense substances
21 Andrew Dole calls the strategy of transcendental freedom “quixotic and unpromising”
ðSchleiermacher on Religion, 61Þ. However, he misunderstands what is implied by the view.
22 Leibniz,Theodicy, § 65, 158.
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originate actions from themselves in accordance with their intelligible char-
acter ðmonadic propertiesÞ and can be considered, as such, as transcen-
dentally free.23 Kant notes the connections quite clearly in Reflexion 5653:
“with respect to the intelligible, the concept of freedom is already necessarily
intrinsically connected with the concept of substance, since a substance
must be the ultimate subject of its actions and cannot itself be the mode of
action of another” ðAA 18:311Þ.
It is important to keep in mind that the inner powers of substances, their
intrinsic or monadic properties, cannot appear. For were they to appear,
they would no longer be monadic or intrinsic properties, but relational ones.
While the inner powers of a substance determine its states, how these states
themselves are apprehended will also depend upon the receptive powers
of that to which such a substance stands in relation. These also play a role
in the way the powers of the substance are received. Schleiermacher is aware
of this distinction; in On Religion, he notes that “what you thus intuit and per-
ceive is not the nature of things, but their action upon you.”24 His distinction
between the “nature of a thing” and its “action upon you” can only make
sense in relation to the distinction between an object’s intrinsic or monadic
properties ðthe nature of a thingÞ and its relational properties ðits action
upon usÞ, an action which is only possible given our receptive capacities.
Here Schleiermacher has in mind our capacities to receive sensations.
TheMonologen signals a fundamental shift in Schleiermacher’s thinking
in regard to the question of freedom. Here, against the deterministic asser-
tions of the empiricists, Schleiermacher argues that spirits are free. The world
is “spirit’s most beautiful work, its self-created mirror” ðKGA I.3:9Þ. Instead
of thinking of our mental states as causally determined by the world, what
is stressed is the mind’s activity in interpreting the world. It is freedom that
“plays the melody, selects the key, and all subtle modulations are her work.
For these proceed from an inner determination and from the individual’s
unique disposition” ðKGA I.3:10Þ. Importantly, Schleiermacher discusses the
problem of freedom in relation to a distinction between the inner and the
outer. Freedom proceeds from an inner determination, namely, the subject’s
inner powers. This “inner” of the subject should not be confused with the
subject’s mental representations or states, which can be taken as replacing
one another in accordance with strict causal laws. These appear also, and are
such external. The empiricist, according to Schleiermacher, sees only the
outer, that is, the determination of one mental state or representation by
the prior state that it replaced. As such, the empiricist sees only a causal de-
termination at work even in her own mental representations:
23 As Kant notes, the self as noumenon “begins its effects in the sensible world from itself, with-
out its action beginning in it itself ” ðKrV A541/B569Þ.
24 Friedrich Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter
ðCambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996Þ, 24–25.
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Freedom seems to him nothing but an illusion, spread like a veil over a hidden and
incomprehensible necessity. Moreover, such an empiricist, whose action and thought
look outward, sees everything as finite and particular. He cannot imagine himself as
other than a sum of fleeting appearances, each of which replaces and cancels the
other, so that it is impossible to think of them as a whole. A complete picture of his
being thus escapes him in a thousand contradictions. . . . But within the spirit all is
one, each action only complements the other, in each the other also is preserved. . . .
Each of my acts reveals the whole of my being, undivided, each of its manifestations
goes with the rest. ðKGA I.3:12Þ
Whoever sees and recognizes only the outer spectacle of life instead of the spiritual
activity that secretly stirs his inmost being . . . may never set foot within the sacred
precincts of freedom, even though he thinks he has attained self-consciousness. For
in the image he constructs of himself, this very self becomes something external,
like all else, and everything in such an image is determined by external circumstance.
ðKGA I.3:9Þ
Two things are apparent in Schleiermacher’s discussion. First, Schleier-
macher argues that the self as it appears, even to itself, becomes “something
external,” and insofar as the self is considered in this way “everything in such
an image is determined by external circumstance.” On the other hand, in-
sofar as the self understands itself in terms of the “spiritual activity that stirs
½its$ inmost being,” it grasps itself as free, that is, as not predetermined in its
activity by causes lying outside of it. Second, on this understanding of the in-
ner spiritual powers of the self that express themselves into the outer, each
mental state that appears is not understood in isolation. It is not simply
grasped as standing in external causal relations to other states of the self,
but is rather understood as expressive of the whole of the inner self. From
the standpoint of spirit, in each action “the other also is preserved.”
The significant ways in which Schleiermacher’s discussion inMonologen
reproduce moves that had already been signaled by Kant cannot be ig-
nored. Schleiermacher contrasts the view of the self in accordance with its
inner determinations ðthe precinct of freedomÞ with the external, the do-
main of causal necessitation by what lies outside the self. In a similar fash-
ion, Kant had famously argued that the self can be understood from two
points of view. As appearance ðand note that what appears are always rela-
tional propertiesÞ, the self is to be understood as empirically determined in
accordance with causal necessity. However, insofar as the self is considered
noumenally, that is, as it is in itself, its causality is not to be thought of as de-
termined by something outside of it:
But the very same subject, being on the other side conscious of himself as a thing
in itself, also views his existence insofar as it does not stand under conditions of time
and himself as determinable only through laws that he gives himself by reason; and
in this existence of his nothing is, for him, antecedent to the determination of his will,
but every action—and in general every determination of his existence changing conform-
ably with inner sense, even the whole sequence of his existence as a sensible being—
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is to be regarded in the consciousness of his intelligible existence as nothing but the
consequence and never as the determining ground of his causality as a noumenon.
ðAA 5:98Þ
Instead, any action of the self that appears temporally can, from this point
of view, be understood as the expression of the self ’s noumenal causality.
Schleiermacher’s discussion of action as expressive of the whole of the inner
self inMonologen ð“within the spirit all is one”Þ has deep parallels with Kant’s
view.
V. THE LIMITS OF TRANSCENDENTAL FREEDOM
In order to fully comprehend the continuities and discontinuities between
Kant’s modified Leibnizianism and the later Schleiermacher on the subject
of transcendental freedom, it is important to disentangle two notions in Kant’s
texts too often confused with one another. Recall that transcendental free-
dom is “the power of beginning a state of itself ½von selbst$—the causality of
which does not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in
accordance with the law of nature” ðKrV A533/B561Þ. Key here is the notion
that the causality of the transcendentally free agent is not itself causally de-
termined in time.25 Transcendental freedom must be distinguished from
Kant’s notion of our power of free choice ðWillku¨rÞ—a significantly different
notion. Kant defines theWillku¨r as “a power to do or to refrain from doing
as one pleases ðein Vermogen nach Belieben zu thun oder zu lassen” ðAA
6:213Þ. While it is often believed that transcendental freedom implies the
power of doing otherwise, key texts in Kant’s corpus show that he did not
conceive of it that way. Furthermore, the logic of what it means to be a sub-
stance whose intelligible character is not determined by causes lying outside
of it does not imply the freedom of the Willku¨r. InReligion within the Bound-
aries of Mere Reason Kant notes that
there is no difficulty in reconciling the concept of freedom with the idea of God as
a necessary being, for freedom does not consist in the contingency of an action ðin
its not being determined through any ground at allÞ i.e. not indeterminism ð½the
thesis$ that God must be equally capable of doing good or evil, if his action is to be
called freeÞ but in absolute spontaneity. The latter is at risk only with predetermin-
ism, where the determining ground of an action lies in antecedent time, so that the
action is no longer in my power but in the hands of nature, which determines me
irresistibly; since in God no temporal sequence is thinkable, this difficulty has no
place. ðAA 6:50nÞ26
25 It is important to keep in mind that for Kant the series of the states of the mind, as given in
inner sense, belong to the realm of appearance.
26 Compare Kant’s remarks in the Lectures on the Philosophical Doctrine of Religion: “One might
raise the objection that God cannot decide otherwise than he does, and so does not act freely
but out of the necessity of his nature. . . . But in God it is not due to the necessity of his nature
that he can decide only as he does. Rather it is true freedom in God that he decides only what is
suitable to his highest understanding” ðAA 28:1068Þ.
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Here Kant acknowledges that absolute spontaneity ðtranscendental free-
domÞ does not imply the freedom of theWillku¨r, that is, the freedom to will
otherwise. God cannot arbitrarily choose good or evil, but must will in ac-
cordance with the divine understanding. The fact that God must do so does
not threaten God’s absolute spontaneity, for God is not determined by any-
thing outside of Godself, and in God there is no temporal sequence, either.
Following Derk Pereboom, we can distinguish transcendental freedom
from the freedom of theWillku¨r in the following way: we can identify tran-
scendental freedom with source incompatibilism, and the notion of the
Willku¨r with leeway incompatiblism.27 Source incompatibilism implies the
will is not determined by temporally prior causes; it is as such directly in-
compatible with transcendental realism about causation in the natural order.28
It is, however, perfectly consistent with the notion of a complete metaphysi-
cal determinism concerning the intelligible character of substances from
which action in the world of appearances ultimately might derive. On the
other hand, the notion of leeway incompatibilism, that is, the notion “could
have done otherwise at time t,” is not only prima facie inconsistent with causal
determinism, it is ultimately inconsistent with the idea of any determining
grounds, including purely logical ones. If Kant is to uphold leeway incom-
patibilism, then persons must be able to timelessly choose their intelligible
character, and this choice of intelligible character, grounding the self as ap-
pearance, would itself appear to be groundless. Fichte, famously, developed
Kant’s thought along these lines, and for this reason he quite rightly noted
that if the will is to determine itself, that is, if it is to be considered its own
ground of its determinations, it must be “originally formless;”29 he notes fur-
ther that “the true spirit of the Critical philosophy” demands that we recog-
nize that “the principle of sufficient reason can by no means be applied to
the act of determining absolute self-activity through itself ði.e., to the act of
willingÞ.”30 Schleiermacher did not go this route in his development of Kant’s
thought.
Key to understanding Schleiermacher’s metaphysics, and how he agreed
and disagreed with Kant, is to underscore that the later Schleiermacher was
a source incompatibilist affirming transcendental freedom, but not a leeway
incompatibilist. Insofar as the self, for Schleiermacher, is completely depen-
dent upon God, not only for its preservation but for its very existence, what
the self is in its internal constitution ðwhat Kant would have called its intel-
ligible characterÞ, has its complete ground in God, and is, as such, determined
by God. This implies the complete determination of all substances through the
27 Derk Pereboom, “Kant on Transcendental Freedom,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Re-
search 73, no. 3 ð2006Þ: 537–67.
28 Transcendental realism assumes that space and time, and the SSV model of causation asso-
ciated with them, are features of things in themselves.
29 “J. G. Fichte: Review of Leonhard Creuzer, Skeptical Reflections on the Freedom of the Will,” trans.
Daniel Brezeale, Philosophical Forum 32, no. 4 ð2001Þ: 293.
30 Ibid., 294.
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divine causality, and thereby excludes leeway indeterminism, which would
ultimately require a kind of groundlessness of the internal properties of sub-
stances. In this regard Schleiermacher can be taken to stand in agreement
with Leibniz, for whom the monads were completely determined by God in
accordance with their complete concept. However, it is important to stress that
for Schleiermacher, insofar as a substance is not fully determined through
the world outside it, that is, insofar as the substance is determined in accor-
dance with its own internal powers, it is transcendentally free. Hence in
Christian Faith he tells us that “the activities of free beings are determined
from within” ðKGA I.13,1:298Þ. Through this lens we can make sense of
Schleiermacher’s statement in the Dialektik of 1818: “Necessity does not re-
strict freedom at all, but rather both are the same thing, only viewed from
different sides” ðKGA II.10,2:220Þ.
VI. ONTOLOGY FROM A FIRST PERSON POINT OF VIEW
Source incompatibilism stands at the heart of Christian Faith. Paragraph 4
of Christian Faith contains a lengthy account of the nature of human con-
sciousness, a careful reading of which reveals that it is strongly marked by
Kant’s account of self-consciousness in the B-edition of the transcendental
deduction. In §§ 24–25 Kant distinguishes between ðaÞ the synthetic original
unity of apperception, namely, the original activity of the I think, and ðbÞ the
self as it appears to itself: “in the synthetic original unity of apperception, I
am conscious of myself not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but
only that I am” ðKrV B157Þ. In the original unity of apperception I am im-
mediately aware of my existence since I have immediate access to my own
activity of thinking. As Kant notes, however, self-consciousness is only pos-
sible insofar I am also aware of the “determination of my existence,” which
“can only occur in correspondence with the form of inner sense” ðKrV B158Þ.
The immediate awareness that I am must always be conjoined with a con-
sciousness of the self as it appears to itself in a determinate state.
This double constitution of self-consciousness plays a key role in the B ver-
sion of Kant’s transcendental deduction, and Schleiermacher’s discussion of
the sensuous self-consciousness in § 4 ofChristian Faith not only follows Kant’s
account of the duality of self-consciousness, but contains significant commen-
tary upon it.31 Analysis of the exact nature of the duality of self-consciousness
reveals ðaÞ the nature of the immediate self-consciousness; ðbÞ its relation to
spontaneity, or the activity of the self; ðcÞ the relation of the immediate self-
31 Concerning this duality of self-consciousness, Kant importantly notes: “But how the I that
I think is to differ from the I that intuits itself ðfor I can represent other kinds of intuition as at
least possibleÞ and yet be identical with the latter as the same subject, how therefore I can say that
I as intelligence and thinking subject cognize myself as object that is thought, insofar as I am also
given to myself in intuition, only, like other phenomena, not as I am for the understanding, but
rather how I appear to myself, this is no more and no less difficult than how I can be an object for
myself in general and indeed one of intuition and inner perception” ðKrV B155Þ.
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consciousness to the intentional consciousness of the self to which it is di-
rected ðthe self as it stands in relation to the worldÞ, and ðdÞ the relation of
the immediate self-consciousness to the higher self-consciousness. Schleierma-
cher begins § 4.1 as follows:
In any genuine self-consciousness, whether it merely accompanies a thinking or a
doing, or whether it fills a moment for itself, we are never conscious of the self in
and of itself in its unchanging identity alone, but rather we are always at the same
time also aware of the self’s changing determinations. The I in itself can be repre-
sented objectively; however, every self-consciousness is at one and the same time that
of a changing state. Yet, already implied in this difference of the latter from the for-
mer is that what changes does not stem from the self in its unchanging identity alone,
for in such a case it would be undistinguishable from it. Thus there are two elements
in every self-consciousness, which we may call a self-positing element and a non-self-
positing element, or rather, a being, and a having so become in some way or another.
Thus, for each self-consciousness, the latter presupposes something else outside the
I through which it is determined, and without which the self-consciousness would not
be exactly the one that it is. However, this something different is not objectively rep-
resented in the immediate self-consciousness, with which we are here alone con-
cerned. For certainly this duplication of consciousness is the reason why in each case
we objectively seek out something else to which we can attribute the origin of our
change of state. However, this search is another act with which we are nownot concerned.
In self-consciousness these two are simply together, one element expressing the
being of the subject for itself, the other its being with what is other than itself. To
these two elements, insofar as they exist together in the temporal self-consciousness,
correspond the receptivity and the spontaneity of the subject. ðKGA I.13,1:34–35Þ
Now the “self-positing” element, that is, the spontaneity of the subject, is pre-
cisely the activity of a free being in its thinking and acting. It must be distin-
guished from the determinate states of consciousness that we can become
aware of when we make consciousness our object. Awareness of this “self-
positing” element is given in the immediate awareness of the “I think,” namely,
in the very activity of cognizing. This is consciousness of the self in its “unchang-
ing identity.” This self-identical consciousness, however, is always accompa-
nied by an awareness of the self’s changing determinations, which “do not
stem from the self in its unchanging identity alone,” but which arise in vir-
tue of a reciprocal relation of influence and counterinfluence between self
and world. The immediate consciousness of spontaneity cannot exist by itself;
consciousness is always directed to an object other than itself, and in its di-
rectedness is determined by it. Were this not the case, such a consciousness
“would express only spontaneity; not being directed to any object, it would
be only an outward urge, an undetermined agility without form or color”
ðKGA I.13,1:34Þ. Yet it is important to note that the determination of con-
scious states by that which is other than the self is not something that occurs
through the sheer influence of that which is distinct from the self. Deter-
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mination of such states also requires our counterinfluence; as Schleierma-
cher notes, “what is other ½than the self $ is determined by us, and without our
spontaneity could not be determined in such a way” ðKGA I.13,1:35Þ. Even our
very receptivity is a power through which what is given must be received in
virtue of our own counterinfluence, which allows it to be received in a certain
way. As such, Schleiermacher argues, the feeling of absolute dependence “can
in no way stem from the effect of an object given to us in some way or another,
for on such an object a counterinfluence would also exist, and even its volun-
tary resignation would always also contain a feeling of freedom” ðKGA I.13,1:
37–38Þ.
While Schleiermacher’s principle concern is with the immediate self-
consciousness, exactly what it is cannot be understood without careful anal-
ysis of the “duplication of consciousness” involved in self-consciousness,
which contains two elements. The immediate consciousness is that dimen-
sion of consciousness through which we are intentionally aware of objects;
it is the dimension of our cognitive activity. This dimension of conscious self-
activity must be strictly distinguished from the objects to which consciousness
is directed. The self can, of course, make itself its own object, and insofar as
it is its own object, it has a mediated awareness of itself. However, the activity
of the self through which the self makes itself its own object is distinct from
the self as object of cognition. This dimension of the self as active cognizer can
only be accessed through an immediate awareness of the self ’s self-activity,
that is, through the feeling or experience that the self has of itself as it acts. It
is distinct from the self as object of reflection. The self that reflects upon itself
ðthe I thinkÞ always transcends the self that is the content of its reflection, for
it is that throughwhich the reflection is cognized, and cannot be contained in
it.Moreover, it is important to note that the self can only cognize itself as dis-
tinct from and standing in relation to the world insofar as it has made itself its
own object of reflection.
Throughout § 4 Schleiermacher argues that the immediate self-consciousness
cannot exist by itself; self-consciousness and, as such, self-awareness, is pos-
sible only when an object distinct from consciousness in its self-activity is
presented to it. In other words, consciousness can only make itself its own
object if it stands in relation to something outside of it. This is because it is
only when consciousness is determined to exist in a certain state through the
influence of that which is distinct from it that it can reflect upon itself, for
such a reflection of the self on itself is only possible if in self-consciousness
there is a self-identity in difference, that is, if the self as object can be differ-
entiated from the self as cognizer, while at the same time the identity of both
is preserved. Such differentiation is possible only insofar as the moments of
the self as reflected upon are states of awareness determined through the
mutual influence between the self and what is other than the self.
Two things are important in this regard. First, in the first element of self-
consciousness, namely, the self-positing element or the I think, the self
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grasps itself immediately in its activity. Second, in the second element of self-
consciousness, moments of the self as object of reflection are co-determined
by both the spontaneity ðself-activityÞ of the subject and the subject’s recep-
tivity insofar as it has been affected in a certain way. Since the first element in
self-consciousness is simply the subject in its sheer activity, it is not depen-
dent on the world; and since the second element of self-consciousness is a
product of both spontaneity and receptivity, it too cannot be understood
as fully dependent on the world. As such, Schleiermacher’s account of self-
consciousness as presented in § 4 is one in which transcendental freedom,
understood as the capacity to begin an action von selbst, plays a key role. Even
if, as Schleiermacher argues, the spontaneity of the subject is always colored
mood-wise by how it has been affected, this spontaneity is never fully deter-
mined by what lies outside the self. And insofar the self-positing of the subject
springs from its own internal powers, it is transcendentally free. Schleierma-
cher’s account of consciousness in § 4 is completely distinct from the state-
state view discussed above, wherein a state of consciousness is fully deter-
mined to be what it is by past states of consciousness.
All of this is absolutely key to Schleiermacher’s development of the notion
of absolute dependence. At the end of § 4.3 he notes that the feeling of ab-
solute dependence
can in no way stem from the effect of an object given to us in some way or another,
for on such an object a counterinfluence would also exist, and even its voluntary
resignation would always also contain a feeling of freedom. Therefore, strictly speak-
ing, the feeling of absolute dependence cannot exist as such in a single moment, for
the totality of its inner contents is always determined by what is given, therefore by that
towards which we have a feeling of freedom. However, the self-consciousness ac-
companying the whole of our spontaneity ðand, since this spontaneity is never zero,
accompanying all of our existenceÞ, and which cancels absolute freedom, is in and
for itself a consciousness of absolute dependence, for it is the consciousness that
the entirety of our spontaneity, in relation to which we should have had a feeling
of absolute freedom, springs from elsewhere, even as it must have sprung from our-
selves. Without all feeling of freedom, however, a feeling of absolute dependence
would not be possible. ðKGA I.13,1:38Þ
The feeling of absolute dependence cannot arise from the objects to which
consciousness is directed ðthe world as object of consciousnessÞ, for on those
consciousness always directs a determining counterinfluence. Conscious-
ness is, as such, only partially determined by what lies outside it; it not only
contains a self-positing element, namely, the activity of the I think, but it also
partially determines what is given to it through both its spontaneity and its
receptive powers. This is further developed in § 32.2 of Christian Faith, where
Schleiermacher notes that the consciousness of being one with the world, in
which we are aware of ourselves as “one of the living parts co-existing with this
whole,” cannot be equated with the feeling of absolute dependence. This is
because
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all the living parts mutually influence one another, so that the existence of the part
with the whole is essentially twofold: admittedly, a feeling of dependence, insofar as
the other parts are active in their influence upon it. However, there is also a feeling of
freedom insofar as it is itself active and influences the other parts, and the one cannot
be separated from the other. Hence the feeling of absolute dependence should not
be understood as a being with the world, but rather as a being with God as the absolute
undivided unity. For in immediate relation to God there is neither a feeling of free-
dom, nor can the feeling of dependence in relation to God be one that contains a
partial feeling of freedom; rather at the highest level of Christian piety, and in the
clearest consciousness of one’s unfettered self-activity, the absoluteness of the feeling
of dependence in relation to God remains unlimited. ðKGA I.13, 1:203–4Þ
Only in and through the consciousness of one’s self activity in relation to the
world is a feeling of absolute dependence toward God possible. If we are to
speak of absolute dependence, then it must be the self in its very activity of
cognizing the world that is understood as dependent on a source that tran-
scends both self and world, and is the source of both. Schleiermacher cannot
be clearer: absolute dependence is “the consciousness that the entirety of our
spontaneity, in relation to which we should have had a feeling of freedom,
springs from elsewhere.” Given that the world with which Schleiermacher
concerns himself is the world as it is given to consciousness, the absolute de-
pendence of our conscious activity on a source outside ourselves also encom-
passes the world as object of conscious reflection, for the self becomes aware
of itself through its world. Both the self and its world are absolutely depen-
dent, and as such the “whence” from which both our spontaneity and recep-
tivity springs “is not the world, in the sense of the totality of temporal exis-
tence, and even less is it any single part of the world” ðKGA I.13,1:39Þ.
Schleiermacher recognized that only in relation to consciousness is ontol-
ogy possible, for outside of consciousness we cannot relate to, even less know,
anything at all. This is presupposed in § 50, where Schleiermacher claims that
“All determinations that we attribute to God do not characterize anything
particular in God, but rather refer to something particular in the manner
that the feeling of absolute dependence refers to God” ðKGA I.13,1:300Þ.
God, however, cannot be an object of consciousness, for any such object
would be limited by our counterinfluence: as such it must be stamped by
the active and receptive powers of the knowing subject. Hence any relation
to God can be given in only one way, namely, insofar as in the immediacy of
the experience of the I think there is given also the consciousness that this I
is conditioned in its very existence by a source outside itself. Relation to God
is possible only from a first person perspective, and any attempt to under-
stand God from a third person perspective, that is, as one object among oth-
ers given to consciousness, is always a corruption. Furthermore, the attempt
to understand the relation betweenGod and the self from such a third person
perspective is equally misguided.
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That ontology is possible only in relation to consciousness is also key to
Schleiermacher’s development of the difference between the absolute cau-
sality of God and intra-worldly causality. The understanding of intra-worldly
causality inChristian Faith is especially distinctive: only beings that contain
within themselves their own center of power, namely, monads that can ex-
press these powers out into the world, have genuine causality. These are
what he calls “free causes,” of which human consciousness is the prime ex-
ample. As we have seen,Christian Faith treats consciousness from a first person
point of view, the point of view of the I think. Schleiermacher’s understand-
ing of the Naturzusammenhang is brimming with these free causes, namely,
persons apprehending themselves immediately as centers of power in accor-
dance with their free activity. In § 49.1 he contrasts his own understanding of
nature with a view in accordance with which nature is understood as a mere
mechanism.
The expression “free causes” in our proposition clearly makes a distinction between
freedom and causality in general, and presupposes causes that are not free. Yet,
on the contrary, causes must be free. In the usual understanding of the universal
nature mechanism there is, strictly speaking no causality outside that of free causes.
For here one imagines the being together and mutual influence of things as one
in which there is movement only insofar as something has been moved, and in ac-
cordance with this picture one can consider the influence of each as a mere point of
transition, so that causality is attributed only to the first mover outside this sphere.
That is, in accordance with this conception, excluding the free cause, there is no
causality in the finite; rather outside it there is only the free infinite cause, namely
the divine causality, which is represented as having originally set in motion the entire
sphere through a first push. Were we to include all inferior life in this mechanism,
including the animal and vegetable . . . then free causes, by which we mean persons,
would be the only finite causes, and all it would take for the divine causality to be the
only remaining one would be for persons to think of themselves also as part of the
nature mechanism, treating their consciousness of spontaneity as a mere unavoidable
illusion. Luckily, however, few are capable of such a destructive self-denial, through
which they not only have annihilated the rest of the world, but have made themselves
victims of the completeness of their own view. For in such a manner all causality of the
finite is changed into an illusion. On such grounds we cannot regard a single finite
being as existing for itself, or thereby attribute substantial existence to one point
rather than another in this universal change of being moved and moving again.
Rather, all is either indivisibly one, or a countless mass of discrete points of transi-
tion, namely, atoms. ðKGA I.13,1:295–96Þ
On the view of nature as ameremechanism, what we have is the SSVmodel of
causation discussed above. Here changes of state are fully determined through
prior states ð“there is movement only insofar as it has beenmoved”Þ, and these
states are themselves fully determined by the states that precede them. If, in
order to avoid an infinite regress of states that are mere points of transition
containing no effective power in themselves, we posit a first mover, then only
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that mover will be a free cause. ðThis is what Schleiermacher means when he
notes that “strictly speaking there is no causality outside of free causes,” for
only free causes have effective power—the rest are mere points of transmis-
sionÞ. Such a mover would then be the only genuine cause, for only it would
be expressive of its own power, beginning a series of changes from itself. Thus
all of nature would be bereft of genuine causes, since it would then contain
no genuine centers of power, that is, monads. The idea of the nature mecha-
nism thereby leaves us with mere points of transition, namely, states that con-
tinuously change into other states, but which are not the locus of the effective
power of the movement. Once those continually changing states are under-
stood as the accidents of the one substance, Spinozism is the unavoidable re-
sult. The entailments of the SSV of causation detailed here coincide largely
with those recognized by Kant: were we to think of time as a feature of things
in themselves, the SSV of causation would lead us to think of everything
dependent on a First Being as “merely accidents inhering in substance” with
no real effective power. For “if these things exist merely as its effects in time,
which would then be the condition of their existence itself, then the actions of
these beings would have to be merely its actions that it performs in any place
and in any time” ðAA 5:101–2Þ. While both recognized that the SSV of cau-
sation led to Spinozism, Kant avoided Spinozism through his claim that the
SSV of causation applied to appearances only, and not to things in them-
selves. Certainly in Schleieramcher’sChristian Faith there does not seem to be
such a distinction between appearances and things in themselves. Instead we
have ðaÞ an awareness of the problems and implications associated with
understanding nature as a mere mechanism, ðbÞ a rejection of such a view,
and ðcÞ an adoption of a view of nature filled with self-active substances
standing in interrelation with one another. InChristian Faith Schleiermacher
abandons the SSV model of causation altogether. Instead, monads—free
causes—stand front and center.
In what ways is the view of nature as mechanism problematic? According
to Schleiermacher it annihilates the central point of departure of all genuine
philosophical and theological understanding, namely, the first person point
of view. From the point of view of the first person, we are immediately aware
of ourselves as active centers of power in both our doing and our knowing.
And only an understanding of nature that does justice to the experience of
consciousness as self-active can be adequate to the human reality. Those who
adopt the view of nature as amechanism, and account for their own existence
through this mechanism, treat “their consciousness of spontaneity as a mere
unavoidable illusion.” The view of nature as mechanism does not provide
grounds for the individuation of the subject, that is, grounds for under-
standing “a single finite being as existing for itself.” It therefore does not do
justice to the first person experience of self-consciousness, which must be the
point of departure for any real theology. As Schleiermacher notes, the “non-
religious understanding, which objects to the particularity of the religious
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self-consciousness as a deception, stems in part from those who also explain
away the feeling of freedom as an illusion” ðKGA I.13,1:204Þ.
The understanding of nature we find inChristian Faith is most decidedly
not one of nature as mechanism. Here, instead, we have a view of nature
filled with co-active interdependent conscious substances ðpersonsÞ. And in-
sofar as persons are genuine centers of power in relation to the rest of nature,
namely, insofar as persons can move themselves without having been moved
and thereby institute a series of changes outside of themselves, they are tran-
scendentally free in Kant’s sense. Recall that transcendental freedom is “the
power of beginning a state of itself ½von selbst$—the causality of which does
not in turn stand under another cause determining it in time in accordance
with the law of nature” ðKrV A533/B561Þ. Transcendental freedom does
not mean absolute freedom, such that the influence of the world is denied.
Rather, self-consciousness is both active and receptive, and insofar as self-
consciousness is active, it is transcendentally free. Since transcendental free-
dom has to do with independence from prior temporal causes in accordance
with natural laws, it does not preclude the complete dependence of the I
think on God, and it does not entail leeway incompatibilism.
The religious self-consciousness recognizes further that “the effects of
free action are possible only through the feeling of absolute dependence”
ðKGA I.13,1:295Þ; in absolute dependence we recognize that “the activities
of free beings are determined from within” ðKGA I.13,1:298Þ. The view ex-
pressed here is similar to the Leibnizian one: persons are dependent upon
divine preservation; they are true centers of power in relation to the world
insofar as they are receptive of the divine energy. It is in this sense that the
later Schleiermacher also believed that only substances that are for them-
selves, that is persons, can stand in relation to God. Mere points of transition
in an undivisible unity ðas found in SpinozismÞ, lacking any self-subsistent
identity for themselves, cannot stand in any such relation. Now it may be
objected to both Leibniz and the later Schleiermacher that their own views
make scant progress over Spinozism, since on their view the spontaneity
of the subject itself derives from God, so that God still remains the only
genuine self-active cause. While a complete discussion of themerits of this ob-
jection lies beyond the scope of this essay, the Leibnizian view adopted by
the later Schleiemacher at least has the advantage that it, unlike the variety
of Spinozism discussed here, accommodates the reality of first person ex-
perience.
In the Theodicy, Leibniz makes a very interesting remark regarding the
metaphysical determinism of substances in relation to God and the prob-
lem of agency. He notes that the action of God in relation to a creature “does
not preclude the creature’s participation in actions, since the action of the
creature is a modification of the substance, flowing naturally from it.”32 Not
32 Leibniz, Theodicy, § 32, 142.
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only does the action of the creature stem from its inner nature. More im-
portantly, the creature participates in its action. What might this partici-
pation mean? By this participation I understand that the subject intends her
actions, is aware that she has intended them, and understands them as
coming from herself. Her actions do not simply happen to her. Leibniz notes
that “when we act freely we are not being forced, as would happen if we
were pushed on to a precipice and thrown from top to bottom; and we are
not prevented from having the mind free when we deliberate, as would
happen if we were given a draught to deprive us of discernment.”33 Such an
intending of action, and a first-person awareness of the self as intending it,
is necessary if the self is to deliberate, that is, if is to reflect upon itself and
its own moral development as it acts in the world. For Leibniz as well as
Schleiermacher, even if the person has been completely determined by God,
she is still a center of decision and experience, with an inner life and inner
awareness through which rational participation in her own inner develop-
ment is possible. She is capable of becoming perfect, and participating in her
own perfection insofar as she reflects and acts intentionally. It may be that
the process of becoming perfect, through the having of a narrative history,
is necessary if the agent is to internalize her life in God, even if this process
of perfection has been determined by God from the outset.
Neither Leibniz, Kant or Schleiermacher believed that a self mechanis-
tically determined by outer material causes, when taken as transcendentally
real, is compatible with the possibility of inner self development, moral per-
fectibility, and, in the case of Schleiermacher, religious self-awareness. This
was the case for several reasons. First, purelymechanistic causation or natural
efficient causation is blind. In Kant’s words, while it may operate in accor-
dance with natural laws, it lacks consciousness and cannot operate in accor-
dance with the idea of laws.34 As such, efficient causality is mindless. It is
always grounded in the past, in what has occurred before, and in a law that
binds an event with one that has occurred earlier. It does not operate in-
tentionally or teleologically, as mind does. Mind is always directed at a teleo-
logical goal or aim that has not yet occurred; the sphere of moral action in the
temporal sphere requires that we understand ourselves as minds. Here the
imagined possible future aimed at determines the present.
All three figures recognized the distinct character of reasons and causes,
and did not think that the operations of mind in accordance with reason
could be reduced to the operations of mere mechanism without losing what
is distinctive of mind in the first place. Instead what we have is either a har-
monization between the doings of mind and what occurs on the empirical,
physical level ðLeibnizÞ or an ultimate grounding of appearances in the in-
33 Ibid., § 33, 143.
34 InGroundwork II Kant notes, “Everything in nature works in accordance with laws. Only a
rational being has the faculty to act in accordance with the representation of laws, i.e., in accordance
with principles, or a will ” ðAA 4:412Þ.
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telligible character of persons ðKantÞ. For Leibniz, the internal states of the
monad are harmonized by God with what occurs to its body.35 For Kant, the
intelligible character is what ultimately grounds the appearances.36 In neither
case do we have a blindmechanistic causation or the laws of empirical nature
groundingmind.As I have arguedabove, the later Schleiermacher, too, strongly
resisted the notion that the self should be reduced to a “mere point of tran-
sition” in a causal chain.
These considerations serve to illuminate why Leibniz and Schleierma-
cher thought the complete determination of the individual by God did not
threaten religion and morality, and why they eschewed the determination
of the self by nature. God, as perfect mind, can be the ground of other fi-
nite minds who act intentionally and “participate” in the experience of their
moral and spiritual evolution. Because God is perfect mind, God’s determi-
nation of finite mind does not vitiate its character as mind and its intentional
participation in the moral enterprise. Schleiermacher, very much in the spirit
of Leibniz, characterizes God as love and wisdom ðKGA I.13,2:498Þ. These are
characteristics of God pro nobis, and they serve to illuminate the Christian’s
faith in how God guides the experience of persons so as to redeem and
perfect them.37 Schleiermacher defines the divine wisdom as “the art of re-
35 For instance, in regard to his notion of the preestablished harmony, Leibniz notes in his
Theodicy that “God created the soul in the beginning in such a fashion that it must produce and
represent to itself successively that which takes place within the body, and the body also in such a
fashion that it must do of itself that which the soul ordains. Consequently the laws that connect
the thoughts of the soul in the order of final causes and in accordance with the evolution of per-
ceptions must produce pictures that meet and harmonize with the impressions of bodies on our
organs; and likewise the laws of movement in the body, which follow one another in the order
ofefficient causes, meet and so harmonize with the thoughts of the soul that the body is induced
to act at the same time when the soul wills it” ð§ 62, 157Þ. For Leibniz, while the successive states
of the soul harmonize with the successive states of bodies, efficient causality is clearly not the
ground of mind. The distinction between the two orders, that of nature, operating according to
laws of efficient causality, and that of mind, which operates in accordance to moral laws, can be
found in numerous works. For instance, in the Monadology ð§ 87Þ he speaks of the harmony
between the kingdom of “efficient causes” and the kingdom of “final causes”; G. W. Leibniz,
Philosophical Essays, trans. Robert Ariew and Daniel Garber ðIndianapolis: Hackett, 1989Þ, 224. The
difference between the two kingdoms or two orders is further explained in the fifth letter to
Clarke, where Leibniz notes that “the natural forces of bodies are all subject to mechanical laws,
and the natural forces of minds are all subject to moral laws. The former follow the order of
efficient causes, the latter theorder offinal causes” ðibid., 345Þ. Anexcellent discussionof Leibniz
on the kingdomsof nature andgrace and theirharmony canbe found inRobertMerrihewAdams,
Leibniz, Determinist, Theist, Idealist ðOxford: Oxford University Press, 1994Þ, 82–110.
36 Kant tells us that the appearances “must be grounded in a transcendental object determin-
ing them as mere representations.” The transcendental object has a character, that is a “law of its
causality.” Insofar as we are speaking transcendentally of persons, the subject has an “intelligible
character, through which it is indeed the cause of those actions as appearances, but which does not
stand under any condition of sensibility and is not itself appearance” ðA539/B567Þ. This pas-
sage was also discussed in detail above.
37 In Christian Faith Schleiermacher defines the attributes of love and wisdom in relation to
the work of redemption. In § 166 we find: “The divine love is the attribute through which the
divine nature reveals itself and is known in the work of redemption” ðKGA I.13,2:500Þ. In § 168
the divine wisdom is defined thus: “The divine wisdom is the principle ordering and deter-
mining the world for the divine self-communication effected in redemption” ðKGA I.13,2:508Þ.
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alizing the divine love perfectly” ðKGA I.13,2:499Þ. This wisdom is the “the
right design of ends and means, understood in their manifold determina-
tions and in the whole of their reciprocal relations” ðKGA I.13,2:499Þ. Were
efficient causation to be considered the fundamental metaphysical ground
of mind, the operations of mind would have to be thought of as, at bottom,
mindless. This would amount to the reduction of intentional processes to un-
intentional ones. Were this reduction adopted, so that blind mechanism was
thought to be that which truly characterized fundamental reality, then faith
in the absolute power of God undergirding the individual’s intentional par-
ticipation in the work of redemption must also be thought to be a delusion.
Like Kant, Schleiermacher held to the transcendental freedom of the
subject in relation to the world—that is, Schleiermacher was a source incom-
patibilist. This source incompatibilism allowed him rightly to resist the reduc-
tion of the moral order to the natural order. On the other hand, Schleier-
macher rejected Kant’s leeway incompatibilism. There are two fundamental
reasons for doing so: one philosophical and the other theological. The philo-
sophical reason has to do with the unintelligibility of an ultimately ground-
less freedom, an idea that persists in Kant’s idea that we timelessly choose our
intelligible character. A fundamental theological reason why Schleiermacher
would have rejected leeway incompatibilism is that this incompatibilism
would threaten the confidence of the creature in God’s redemptive work,
and interfere in the person’s faith in herself as absolutely dependent on
God. It is no accident that Schleiermacher pushes us very strongly to uni-
versalism at the end of Christian Faith. All are absolutely dependent on God,
and God’s saving love and wisdom extend to all creation.
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